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Using a sample of 20 emerging countries from 1880 to 1913, we study the determinants and output
effects of sudden stops in capital inflows during an era of intensified globalization. We find that higher
levels of original sin (hard currency debt to total debt) and large current account deficits associated
with reliance on foreign capital greatly increased the likelihood of experiencing a sudden stop. Trade
openness and stronger commitment to the gold standard had the opposite effect. These results are robust
for many sudden stop definitions used in the literature. Finally, we use a treatment effects model to
show that after controlling for endogeneity sudden stops have a strong negative association with growth
in per capita output. We also show that banking, currency and debt crises that were preceded by a



























The pattern of sudden stops in capital inflows to emerging market countries in the last 
30 years has great resonance to events which occurred the first era of globalization 
between 1880 and 1913. This is especially so when we examine events in the late 1880s 
and early 1890s. In those years many emerging countries were beset by a drastic decline 
in capital flows from the core countries of Western Europe and many of these emerging 
markets suffered currency, banking and debt crises. These sudden stops of capital inflows 
have been at the root of volatile economic performance in many emerging markets both 
today and in this previous period. 
Although capital flows declined in virtually every country in this period, the impact on 
the real economy and the incidence of crises differed markedly. These differences 
reflected similar factors to those stressed today: structural differences, exposure to 
shocks, institutions and policies. Especially important in that era was how much of a 
country’s external and internal debt was denominated and made payable in a fixed 
amount of gold or other international currencies. This state has been called “original sin,” 
and it is not a new problem.
1 Like today, it exposed countries to the risk of balance sheet 
induced financial stress and possibly crises, a phenomenon resonant to the role of liability 
dollarization in the financial crises of the 1990s. Whether liability dollarization rendered 
countries more financially fragile or not was related to the presence of strong institutions 
and sound policy--what Caballero, Cowen and Kearns (2004) refer to as country and 
currency trust.  Country trust is based on sound institutions, strong rule of law and stable 
political systems. Currency trust is based on the ability to adhere to a credible nominal 
anchor like the gold standard in the nineteenth century, which required following stable 
monetary policy and fiscal balance. 
2 
This paper applies the methods of the recent empirical literature on sudden stops to the 
late 19
th and early 20
th century experience. We provide results that are directly 
comparable -and strikingly similar- to those of the more recent period which have 
                                                 
1 See Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) for an analysis of original sin in the contemporary period. 
2 See Bordo and Kydland (1996) for more on the effects of adherence to the Gold standard.  
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analyzed sudden stops and financial crises.
3 We study a number of determinants of 
sudden stops, including the size of the trade deficit, the degree of trade openness in the 
economy, the levels of both hard currency debt and total debt, the currency composition 
of debt (original sin) and policy variables like the growth rate of money and reserve 
ratios.  
Our results show that original sin, defined as the level of hard currency debt to total 
debt, is a very robust predictor of sudden stops. This provides evidence for the 
importance of balance sheet effects, with countries that owe large portions of their debt in 
gold or foreign currency facing serious difficulties in repaying their debt under the 
exchange rate depreciations that follow sudden stops.  
Trade deficits in countries receiving capital inflows are also strongly associated with 
sudden stops. This illustrates that reliance on foreign capital may have made countries 
more financially fragile. We go on to show that this may have reduced their growth 
prospects because crises come along with lower growth rates of output.
4 
We find that trade openness reduces the probability of sudden stops, suggesting that 
the benefits of being able to quickly adjust to the current account imbalances are more 
important than the threat of opening up to external shocks.  Similarly, higher gold 
coverage ratios (i.e., gold reserves / money in circulation) also reduce the probability of 
sudden stops, a fact that reflects the importance of signaling and currency trust in the 
ability to prevent crises.  
Next, we look into the relationship between sudden stops and growth. There is no 
question that sudden stop events have historically been coupled with drops in output. But 
are sudden stops directly responsible for a substantial drop in output, or are these drops 
the result of other unobservable factors that also trigger the sudden stop itself? While 
most theoretical models of sudden stops establish a direct link between the sudden stop, 
balance sheet effects and drops in output, other authors like Chari et. al. (2005) present 
models where the sudden stop itself is beneficial for growth because it brings about an 
immediate positive increase in net exports. In this context then, the sudden stop becomes 
a turning point after which output starts to improve. 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Calvo et al. (2004) 
4 Bordo and Meissner (2007) analyze capital inflows directly and find similar results.  
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To answer these questions, we empirically control for the endogeneity of sudden stops 
using a treatment effects model. We conclude that sudden stops are still related to 
reductions in output growth even after accounting for endogeneity. The impact appears 
economically significant with drops in the growth rate averaging more than four  
percentage points below the long-run average growth rates.  Additionally, we also find 
the impact on growth is larger when sudden stops are accompanied by financial crises. 
Banking, currency or debt crises that were preceded by sudden stops had an even greater 
negative impact on output growth than having a sudden stop alone. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 characterizes and identifies sudden stop 
events for our sample, performs a regression analysis on the determinants of the 
probability of sudden stops and studies robustness using several definitions commonly 
found in the literature. Section 3 considers the output effects of sudden stops and other 
financial crises by using a treatments effects model to control for endogeneity. Section 4 
concludes.   
2. Characterizing Sudden Stops 
A sudden stop is characterized by a sharp cut-off of capital flows into a country. It 
reflects an abrupt unwillingness of foreigners to continue financing the country’s current 
account deficit. It is often triggered by an event such as an increase in interest rates in the 
lending countries which reduces capital outflows or a sudden change in expectations 
regarding debt default in the borrowing country. As soon as the sudden stop takes place, 
the debtor finds it impossible any longer to finance its current account deficit. Foreign 
reserves can be used for a while to delay the adjustment, but eventually the current 
account deficit must be turned into a surplus with a sharp improvement in the trade 
balance and a compression of domestic absorption.  
If the country is under a fixed exchange rate regime, like the gold standard which 
prevailed during our period of study, the adjustment must be made via a reduction in 
spending. In the face of sticky wages and prices this leads to an economic recession. 
Alternatively, the government may decide to devalue (alter its gold parity) or leave the 
gold standard, accelerating the real depreciation process.  In theory, this could prevent a 
recession altogether, but as the experience of sudden stops in many emerging countries in  
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the 1990s and early 2000s has shown, currency depreciations can lead to strong balance 
sheet effects, bankruptcies, financial crises and drops in output.   
2.1 Identifying Sudden Stops 
 
In this section we identify sudden stop events in our sample of 20 emerging market 
countries using several identification criteria that are common in the literature. 
A sudden stop is generally defined as a large and unexpected fall in a country’s net 
capital inflows, usually coupled with drops in economic activity. In theory, sudden stops 
can occur without a current account reversal if foreign reserves are used to maintain the 
level of the current account deficit. In practice however, reserves are seldom large 
enough to be a practical or permanent solution, and eventually the current account needs 
to adjust.  This makes identification of sudden stops easier, given that current account (or 
trade balance) data can be used, and is particularly convenient for our period of study, for 
which direct capital flows data is scarce. 
Using simple balance of payment accounting identities, we first construct a proxy for 
net capital inflows by subtracting the trade balance from changes in foreign reserves.
5   
Next, we create several indicator variables for sudden stops. Our main indicator, 
which we call “SS1”, follows Calvo et al. (2004) closely and considers a country as 
having a sudden stop during a given year if there is an annual drop in net capital inflows 
of at least two standard deviations below the mean of the year-to-year changes for the 
period, and/or it is the first year of a drop in net capital inflows that exceeds 3 percent of 
nominal GDP over a period shorter than four years, and there is a drop in real GDP (of 
any magnitude) during that year or the following year.
 6 
With this definition, we are requiring reversals to be sudden and large relative to the 
volatility experienced by that particular country during the period. This is important, 
since countries could differ substantially in the type and stability of foreign capital 
                                                 
5  Balance of Payments = Current Account + Net Capital Inflows (NKI) – Change in Reserves , where 
Current Account = Trade Balance + Net Factor Payment + Unilateral Transfers. Therefore NKI = Change 
in Reserves – CA.  
By using trade balance data, our NKI proxy includes net factor payments and unilateral transfers which, 
although potentially important in magnitude for some countries in this period, are not expected to change 
significantly on a yearly-basis.  
6 The specific conditions, such as the two standard deviation cutoff, are common in the literature. See 
Calvo et al (2004) and Catão (2006).  
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inflows and investments.  Our identification strategy also allows for reversals which may 
take longer to materialize but still represent a significant share of GDP. Finally, the 
inclusion of the drop in output allows us to differentiate sudden stops crises from positive 
terms of trade shocks which also lead to current account reversals but are coupled with 
increases in GDP and real exchange rate appreciations.   
We applied these criteria to a sample of 20 emerging market countries between 1880 
and 1913: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 
Finland, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United States.
7 The data was compiled from previous work by Bordo et. 
al. (2001), Bordo and Meissner (2006), Flandreau and Zúmer (2004), Mitchell (1992) and 
Obstfeld and Taylor (2003), among others. See the Appendix for further details.  
The sudden stop events identified in the data are shown in Table 1. During the period 
1880-1913, there were 34 sudden stops in the countries considered; 17 countries (85% of 
total) were affected and 9 countries (45% of total) had two or more sudden stops.
8   
Figure 1 shows the pattern of average net capital inflows to GDP and the global 
number of sudden stops in each year. Capital inflows increased considerably in the early 
1880s and then experienced a sharp drop in the 1890s. Sudden stops occurred every time 
there was a downturn in capital inflows, but there is evidence of “bunching” around the 
early 1890’s and around 1900. These are well-known periods of macroeconomic 
instability in capital importing countries, as analyzed extensively in the literature on 
financial crises in the late nineteenth century.
9 
Sudden stops were by far the most common type of financial disruption during this 
period. Figure 2 compares the frequency of sudden stops with that of other financial 
crises: banking, currency and debt crises. We define frequency as the number of years a 
country was in crisis divided by the total possible years of observation (excluding years 
of ongoing crises). As can be seen, the probability of a sudden stop was the highest of all 
events in the pre 1914 period at 5.3%. Crises were rarer events than sudden stops, with 
                                                 
7 Following Bordo and Eichengreen we treat the US as an emerging country although in most respects it 
was an advanced country with the principal exception that it was a net recipient of capital inflows until the 
turn of the twentieth century and it had a relatively unstable banking system. 
8 See Table A2 in the Appendix for further details.  
9 See Bordo et al (2001), Bordo and Eichengreen (2002).    
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banking crises being the most likely at 3.5%, followed by currency crises at 3.1% and 
debt crises at 1%.
10  
In terms of timing, sudden stops tended to occur shortly before other financial crises. 
About 40% of sudden stop events were followed by a financial crisis (either debt, 
currency or banking crisis) within only three years.
11 This provides some evidence for the 
link between sudden stops, balance sheet effects and financial crises. In section 3 we 
study in more detail the interaction between sudden stops and other financial crises 
through their combined effects on output. 
Figure 3 shows discount rates for core countries (UK, Germany and France), which 
were the main sources of funds for emerging economies. The years that are shaded are 
those with one or more sudden stops. One of the most striking features is that during the 
two most prominent periods of sudden stops, around 1890 and 1900, interest rates in the 
core lending countries were raised sharply. The rise in discount rates in the years 
preceding 1890, for example, reflected a reaction by the Bank of England and other 
central banks to a decline in their gold reserves reflecting burgeoning capital outflows to 
Latin America and other emerging regions to finance an investment boom. The boom 
occurred in a period of depressed economic conditions in England and the other 
European countries when low interest rates and sluggish investment made the higher rates 
of return in the Americas and Australasia very attractive. The boom ended as the 
European economy recovered at the end of the decade and investment opportunities 
reappeared. In the face of rising aggregate demand the Bank of England raised its 
discount rate from 2 ½ to 4%. This was matched by the German Reichsbank and other 
central banks. This policy shock precipitated a massive slowdown in investment abroad.
12 
Overall, this period experienced a pattern of events that included external shocks 
coming from a tightening of monetary policy in the core, a rise in sovereign yield 
spreads, a drying up of capital flows, current account reversals, a decline in nominal 
exchange rates in countries with paper currencies, a decline in real output and a spate of 
                                                 
10 Bordo and Meissner ( 2007) using a larger sample of 30 countries find a fairly similar pattern for the 
three traditional types of crises. The probability of a banking crisis was 3.8%, of a currency crisis 2.2% and 
of a debt crisis 1%.  
11 See Table A3 and Figure A2 in the Appendix for a country-by-country analysis. 
12 See Bordo (2006)  
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financial crises. See Bordo (2006) for more descriptive statistics on capital flows, 
exchange rates, spreads and financial crises during this period.  
2.2 The Determinants of Sudden Stops  
 
Many factors can contribute to both the likelihood of sudden stops and their effect on 
economic activity. The degree of openness can play an important but ambiguous role. It 
can make a country more vulnerable to sudden stops simply because it may be more 
exposed to foreign shocks. But it can also make a country less vulnerable because it can 
facilitate the current account adjustment needed once a sudden stop occurs.
13 For 
example Calvo and Talvi (2005) demonstrate how a depreciating real exchange rate 
requires a greater compression by the non-traded goods sector in the case of a relatively 
closed economy.   
The extent of original sin can also seriously impact the balance sheet of firms and 
especially the banking sector. Exchange rate depreciation increases the local currency 
value of liabilities relative to local currency assets.  This can contribute to a banking 
crisis as the collateral backing bank loans deteriorates. It can also lead to a debt crisis for 
governments whose debts are in hard currency and whose tax revenues are in local 
currency.  Both a banking crisis and the expectation of a debt crisis can generate currency 
crises, as international reserves which serve to back the banking system’s liabilities as 
well as the government’s balance sheet are threatened (Dooley 2000, Mishkin 2003).  
More generally, sound fiscal and monetary policies and strong institutions can help to 
both prevent and stabilize the effects of sudden stops.  
2.3 Regression Analysis of Determinants 
 
In order to study the determinants of sudden stops, we run a pooled probit regression 
with heteroscedasticity robust, standard errors clustered at the country level. Our data set 
is an unbalanced panel and our observational unit is the country-year.  
Our dependent variable is the indicator variable for sudden stops, SS1. We use as 
independent variables several factors identified in  the literature as important 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Milesi-Ferreti and Razin (1998). For more on openness and sudden stops, see Cavallo 
and Frankel (2004).   
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determinants:
 the ratio of the trade balance to GDP, the degree of openness (exports plus 
imports divided by GDP), the degree of “original sin” (share of total public debt 
denominated in gold or foreign currency), the gold coverage ratio (reserves / money in 
circulation), the ratio of gold or foreign currency debt to GDP, the ratio of total debt to 
GDP and the growth rate of the money stock.
14 We also control for real GDP per capita 
and lag all variables one period.
15  To control for time effects, we include the English 
consol rate in all regressions.  
2.4 Estimation results 
 
Our results  are summarized in Table 2 where coefficients shown are average 
marginal effects on the probability of a sudden stop. Model (1) is our main specification 
with key explanatory variables. Most results are strong and statistically significant.  
As expected, the coefficient on trade balance to GDP is negative and statistically 
significant. Sudden stops affect countries with negative trade balance to GDP ratios. The 
higher this ratio, the lower the country’s dependence on foreign capital and therefore the 
lower the likelihood of a sudden stop. Our estimates show that an increase of 4.7 
percentage points in the trade balance to GDP ratio, which represents a one standard 
deviation change for this variable in our sample, decreases the probability of a sudden 
stop (conditional on keeping other variables at their means) by 0.02.
16  Given that the 
conditional probability of a sudden stop is only 0.02 when we evaluate all variables at 
their means, this represents a 100% decrease in the predicted probability. The trade 
balance to GDP is clearly a strong –though perhaps unsurprising- determinant of sudden 
stops.   
We also find that higher levels of trade openness can greatly decrease the probability 
of experiencing a sudden stop. An increase of 17.9 percentage points in trade openness, 
                                                 
14 These variables have also been used in similar papers for more modern historical periods. See Calvo et al 
(2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2006), Sturzenegger and Guidotti (2005) and Edwards (2004). Many of our 
results in this section are directly comparable to those in these studies.  
15 Many papers in the literature use lagged variables to control for endogeneity, but it is not really a solution 
given the high persistency in the series. We include lags to follow the literature, but show in Appendix 
Table A5 that our results are robust to the removal of all lags.  Other authors control for endogeneity using 
instrumental variable techniques. For example, Cavallo and Frankel (2004) use gravity estimates to control 
for endogeneity in the degree of trade openness. However, most of these studies find that results do not 
vary significantly after controlling for endogeneity.  
16 0.047*(-0.424)= 0.02  
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also a one standard deviation change in our sample, decreases the predicted conditional 
probability by 0.018 or 90%. This supports the view that openness makes the adjustment 
process easier (improving the trade balance is simpler if the economy is already heavily 
engaged in international trade), and is in line with empirical results by Edwards (2004), 
Cavallo and Frankel (2004) and Calvo et al. (2004) for the more recent historical period.  
Among policy variables, the gold coverage ratio has a significant negative effect on 
the probability of a sudden stop.  A one standard deviation increase, equal to 31 
percentage points in our sample, decreases this probability by 0.019, or 95%. This 
variable, measured by the ratio of gold reserves to money in circulation, is taken here as a 
proxy for the degree of commitment to a sound monetary policy and adherence to the 
gold standard.
17 Our results then support the view that among emerging countries a high 
gold coverage ratio signals the country’s commitment to stable exchange rates, raises 
currency trust and reduces the chances of a sudden stop.   
Among the debt variables, the currency composition of debt is very important, as 
shown by the positive and significant coefficients on original sin. This provides evidence 
for the importance of balance sheet effects in our empirical model. The higher the debt 
denominated in hard currency or gold, the higher the contractionary balance sheet effects, 
and therefore the higher the chances of facing a sudden stop.
18 A one standard deviation 
increase of 33 percentage points increases the probability of Sudden Stops by 0.02 or 
100%.  
 It is important to note that our analysis does not focus on the reasons for the high 
degrees of original sin in many of these countries. As Eichengreen and Hausmann (2003) 
point out, creditors can be reluctant to lend in local currency because a country has weak 
institutions and is prone to manipulating the value of its currency. But original sin can 
also be a result of other factors and market imperfections beyond a country’s control.
19 
Nations with good reputations or solid fundamentals can be obliged to issue debt in hard 
                                                 
17 See Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix 
18 A related variable is the level of currency mismatch, which measures the degree by which hard currency 
liabilities are offset with hard currency assets. A measure used by Bordo and Meissner (2007) is calculated 
as (hard currency debt – reserves / exports). As pointed out by Goldstein and Turner (2004) and Bordo and 
Meissner (2006), a country with higher currency mismatch could find it difficult to repay hard currency 
debt in the event of a depreciation. We have included this variable in some model specifications (not 
shown), but results are not significant for our sample in this period.  
19 See for example Bordo, Meissner and Redish (2004) and Flandreau and Sussman (2004) for discussions 
on the determinants and pace of graduation from original sin.  
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currency, and oppositely, reputedly poor risk countries like Russia in the late nineteenth 
century and Brazil today have managed to sell a large amount of local currency debt to 
international markets.  Regardless of its particular causes then countries suffering from it 
may be more prone to liquidity runs and balance sheet effects. Our results show that 
original sin had a large influence on the probability of experiencing a sudden stop during 
the 1880-1913 period possibly because of its impact on balance sheets and expectations 
about balance sheets.  
In contrast to the compositional effects of debt (original sin), Table 2 shows that the 
level of hard currency liabilities to GDP does not have a significant impact on 
probabilities. This suggests that how much a country owed was not necessarily a 
problem; what really mattered was what percentage of that debt was denominated in hard 
currency. In model (2) we test for the level of total debt to GDP and find similar results.  
The coefficients for the level of real GDP per capita and the growth of money supply 
have the expected signs, but are not statistically significant and model (3) shows that our 
main results are robust to the removal of these control variables.  Finally, although 
standard in the literature, the inclusion of the trade balance to GDP variable is potentially 
problematic for identification, given its importance in our definitions of sudden stops. 
Nevertheless, model (4) shows that our results –particularly for original sin- are not 
affected by the removal of this variable.  
Table 3 summarizes the effects of a one standard deviation change in each of the main 
independent variables. Notably, all of these variables have similar impact on the 
predicted probability of a sudden stop when we consider their actual volatility in our 
sample. Given that the predicted conditional probability of a sudden stop when we 
evaluate all variables at their means is only two percent per year across our sample, the 
economic significance of these regression coefficients is very strong.   
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2.5 Robustness  
 
We now construct two alternative sudden stop indicator variables to show that our 
main results are robust to the various definitions of sudden stops found in the literature.  
Our second sudden stop variable, labeled SS2, does not condition on output drops at 
all. In essence this is a broader definition that focuses exclusively on large net capital 
inflow reversals, regardless of the initial impact on output.  
The third sudden stop dummy, labeled SS3, requires a drop in the real output growth 
rate. It is possible, given lags in the economy, that growth continues for a while even in 
the presence of a sudden stop. An example would be an infrastructure investment that 
takes some time to affect output, like a railroad which facilitates settlement of a remote 
region. In theory though, when a sudden stop takes place there should be at least a 
slowdown in the output growth rate, and that is what SS3 captures. This is also a broader 
definition than SS1.  
Applying these criteria to our sample, we find 63 sudden stop crises under both SS2 
and SS3, although the countries and dates differ between them (see Table A2 in the 
Appendix for details). A close comparison between the three indicator variables shows 
that when there is a large and sudden reversal in net capital inflows (as measured by SS2) 
there may not be an immediate effect on output, but soon the growth rate slows (as 
measured by SS3) and in most cases output ends up falling within two years (as measured 
by SS1).  
We repeat the regression analysis using our main specification (model 1 in Table 2) 
for these alternative sudden stop  measures and show the results in Table 4.  
Under SS2 and SS3, trade openness changes sign but losses significance, while the 
level of hard currency debt to GDP becomes a relevant predictor. However, most of our 
results, including the trade balance to GDP, original sin and gold coverage ratios, remain 
similar to SS1 in both magnitude and significance.  
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3. Sudden Stops, Financial Crises and Growth 
 
In this section we study the effects of sudden stops on the dynamics of output growth. 
We place special interest in the way sudden stops interact with other financial crises 
(currency, debt and banking crises) that may follow.  
Estimating a growth regression using a sudden stop dummy may be problematic due 
to a potential endogeneity problem. Most sudden stop identification criteria involve some 
sort of conditioning on output drops. Even if they do not, sudden stops are still inherently 
endogenous because unobserved factors that contribute to economic downturns may also 
be working to create sudden stops. Moreover, there may be reverse causality: sudden 
stops affect output, but output affects sudden stops as well.  
The estimation of a continuous variable like output per capita using a potentially 
endogenous binary variable can be attempted using a treatment effects regression. In 
addition to controlling for the endogeneity of the sudden stop dummy, this model also 
allows us to estimate the double impact of variables like trade openness on output, both 
directly via its marginal effect in the growth equation and indirectly through the impact 
on the probability of sudden stops.  
In these growth regressions we use the broadest definition for sudden stop, SS2, as 
the dependent variable. Given that this definition includes events where output does not 
drop immediately, our estimation results provide a lower bound for the negative effects 
on output of sudden stops.
20  Furthermore, our robustness analysis in the previous section 
shows that our results on determinants are robust to the choice of the sudden stop 
indicator.
21 
                                                 
20 Moreover, we show in Appendix Table A4 that the results in this section are robust to the use of the 
narrowest sudden stop definition, SS1. 
21 We choose to use SS1 (which conditions on output drops) in the determinants analysis simply because it 
is the standard definition used in the literature.   
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3.1 Regression Analysis of Output Growth 
 
Since our main interest is to analyze the effect of a possibly endogenous binary 
variable (sudden stop dummy) on growth, we use the endogenous treatment effects 
model.
 22  Our empirical specification starts with a growth equation: 
  
(1)     ,, ,  
ss
i ti t i t i it gX D α β δ µ ε =+ + ++ 
 
where  , it g is real GDP per capita growth for country i at time t;  , it X is a vector of 
independent variables;  ,
ss
it D  is a sudden stop dummy;  i µ  are unobserved time-invariant 
and country-specific effects; while α  is a constant and , it ε  is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Our sudden stop dummy  ,
ss
it D  is an endogenous binary variable that depends on the 
realization of an unobserved latent variable 
*
, it L  according to: 
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where  (.) i W  is a set of control variables and  , it ξ is a random error term.
23 Under 
assumptions of normality, equations (2) and (3) can be written as a probit model. The 
treatment effects model simply allows for correlation between the error term in the probit 
model and the growth regression.
24 
                                                 
22 Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) use this procedure to analyze the impact of financial 
liberalization on the probability of crises and growth. Edwards (2004) and Edwards (2005) use a related 
three-step mechanism to study the effects of sudden stops and current account reversals on growth. 
Similarly, Razin and Rubinstein (2004) study the growth effects of exchange rate regimes and currency 
crises. All of these papers focus on the recent crisis experience of the late 20
th and early 21
st centuries.  
23 The subscript(.) means there may be different lags for different variables.  
24 Formally, the model requires the following assumptions: 
i)
2









!  and ii) (,) ε ξ independent of X and W.  
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To illustrate what our model is actually doing consider the simple two-step procedure 
for estimation. First, the treatment equation for the probability of a sudden stop is 
estimated using a probit regression of sudden stops on a set of independent controls  (.) i W  
and a hazard is then obtained for each observation.
25 Second, the growth equation (1) is 
estimated including this hazard as an additional independent variable.  This model is a 
generalization of Heckman’s bivariate selection model to the treatment effects context 
and can be also estimated in one step by maximum likelihood.
26 This is the procedure we 
follow. 
In the treatment regression,  (.) i W  includes the same variables as our main probit in 
section 2 (model 2 in Table 4), with the exception of real per capita income. Most of 
these variables are strong determinants of sudden stops, but are expected not to affect 
output growth directly.  
In the growth regression,  , it X  includes variables that are standard in the growth 
literature:  log of initial real GDP per capita, inflation, government spending to GDP 
ratio, trade openness, education enrolment, population growth and the investment to GDP 
ratio.  
Note that the level of trade openness is included in both the growth and treatment 
regressions. This is not a problem. In fact, this model is identified even when all variables 
are included in both equations (i.e. when ,, i ti t W X = ) due to the non-linearity of the probit 
treatment equation.
27 Our exclusion restriction is that all of the variables in the probit 
model besides openness do not belong in the growth model. 
28 
                                                 
25 The hazard, also called the “Inverse Mills ratio” is defined by: 
,, i , t
,, i , t
ˆˆ () / ()i f  D 1










 Φ=  =  −− Φ =  
where Φ andφ are the c.d.f and density functions of the 
normal distribution.  
26 The Heckman model was initially developed in the wage equation context to deal with selection based on 
unobservables (for example, when only wages for employed people are observed) and later generalized. 
The difference between the wage equation and the treatment context is that in the latter the outcome is 
observed for all units, whether “treated” or not (i.e. we observe growth both with or without a sudden stop).  
27 The model is identified even if  ,, i ti t W X =  due to the non-linearity of the probit treatment equation, but 
Monte Carlo simulations have shown that in finite samples this leads to weak identification. The reason is a 
high degree of collinearity  between the hazard and the regressors in the outcome equation. “Exclusionary 
restrictions”, variables in the treatment equation that are not in the outcome equation, provide stronger 
identification.  
28 See Maddala (1983) and Woolridge (2002) for more detailed specification requirements.  
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3.2 Estimation Results 
 
Estimation results under maximum likelihood are shown in Table 5. The bottom panel 
shows results for the treatment equation while the top panel shows results for the growth 
equation. It is important to note that the number of observations drops significantly as a 
consequence of jointly estimating both output and treatment equations.
29 This is the 
reason why the treatment equation results are not identical to those of the probit 
regression in section 2.  We focus attention on the top panel in Table 5, which shows the 
results from the growth equation. 
Model (A) is our basic growth regression with the endogenous sudden stop dummy 
variable included. Sudden stops are shown to have a strong negative effect on real GDP. 
Our point estimate suggests that growth is four percentage points lower when a sudden 
stop occurs. The coefficient is statistically significant across all model specifications. 
This provides a lower bound to the direct impact of sudden stops on output, given that we 
are using our broadest indicator variable, SS2, which essentially captures sharp net 
capital inflow reversals without requiring immediate drops in GDP. 
As expected, we find that inflation has a strong negative impact on growth. A one 
percent increase in the inflation rate reduces the growth rate by 0.18 percentage points. 
The investment to GDP ratio has a positive impact of even greater magnitude. A one 
percent increase in investment to GDP leads to a 0.25 percent increase in the growth rate. 
Population growth has a negative effect and its coefficient is close to one. 
Another important result is the indirect effect of sudden stops on growth through the 
interaction with financial crises. As mentioned before, 40 percent of our sudden stop 
events were followed by either a currency, banking or debt crisis within three years. The 
specification in model (B) includes a dummy variable for financial crises, which takes a 
value of one if there is any kind of financial crisis during that year and zero otherwise. 
The coefficient is positive but not significantly different from zero. However, model (C) 
replaces this dummy with an indicator of a financial crisis that occurs shortly after a 
sudden stop (within 3 years). These are financial crises which are very likely linked to the 
previous sudden stop. In this case, the negative output effect of financial crises is more 
                                                 
29 The countries included are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain and the US.   
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than doubled and the coefficient becomes statistically significant. Financial crises which 
come shortly after a sudden stop lead on average to an additional 3.6 percentage point 
drop in the growth rate.
  
Finally, as emphasized by Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006), the treatment 
effects model allows us to differentiate direct and indirect effects on growth for those 
variables that are included both in the growth and treatment equations.  Our results show 
that trade openness has both a positive direct effect on growth and a positive indirect 
effect by reducing the probability of sudden stops.  We can calculate the total effect of 
trade openness by using the estimated coefficients. For a given increase, we first compute 
the marginal effect on the probability of a sudden stop using the probit coefficients, then 
we multiply this by the estimated coefficient of sudden stops in the growth regression and 
finally we add the direct effects of openness on growth. Using the estimates of model (A) 
in Table 5, we find that an increase of 10 percentage points in trade openness increases 
the growth rate by 1.1 percentage points. The direct effect on growth is 0.9 percentage 
points while the indirect effect -via a reduction in the probability of sudden stops- is 0.2 
percentage points.  
4. Conclusions 
Our analysis of the determinants and output effects of sudden stops in emerging 
economies, between 1870 and 1913, shows that the pattern of events was remarkably 
similar to the experience of the 1990s and first years of the 21
st century.  Financial 
globalization a century ago made many countries quite vulnerable to external shocks via 
capital inflows as today.  
Among determinants, we find that low levels of original sin, high levels of trade 
openness and sound monetary policies are important to reduce the probability of 
experiencing a sudden stop. Other authors have shown similar results for the more recent 
period.
30  
Balance sheet effects, a result of the combination of high levels of original sin and 
currency depreciation, may play an important role not only as a determinant of sudden 
                                                 
30 See Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia (2004), Cavallo and Frankel (2006), among others.   
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stops but also in explaining why financial crises that are triggered by sudden stops are far 
worse in terms of their effect on GDP than those which are unrelated to them.  
Overall, the lessons from the long run appear to be that sound debt management and 
the development of a large trade sector will allow emerging countries to escape financial 
turmoil. But indeed, what emerging countries really need to do to protect themselves 
from repeated episodes of sudden stops and crises is to mature and develop the sound 
financial institutions of an advanced economy. Today’s emergers may wish to investigate 
the historical experience of countries that were the emergers of a century ago (like the 
US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries), to find out how 
they learned from the experiences of their financial crises and were able to advance to 
greater financial stability.
31 As Caballero, Cowan and Kearns (2004) put it, many 
countries  have yet to develop country and currency trust. The determinants of these 
deeper fundamentals remains an open question but one that needs investigation as global 





                                                 
31 On learning from crises, see Bordo (2007) and Rosenthal and Hoffman (2007).   
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Table 1: Sudden Stops by Country and Year 
(SS1 indicator) 
Country  Year with a Sudden Stop  




Canada 1891,  1908 
Chile 1885,  1893,  1904 
Finland 1901 
Greece  1883, 1886, 1892, 1900, 1906 
India 1902,  1910 
Italy 1888 
Japan  1891, 1899, 1901, 1908 
New Zealand  1883, 1887 
Norway 1902 
Portugal 1892 
Russia 1885,  1888,  1899 
Sweden 1886,  1911 
United States  1895 
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Table 2: Determinants of Sudden Stops 
(SS1 indicator) 
 
Dependent Variable : Sudden Stop Indicator SS1 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
            
Trade Balance to GDP  -0.424**  -0.423**  -0.317  --- 
 [0.188]  [0.207]  [0.259]   
        
Trade Openness  -0.100***  -0.099***  -0.112*  -0.068 
 [0.034]  [0.032]  [0.061]  [0.053] 
        
Gold coverage ratio  -0.060***  -0.061**  -0.021  -0.018 
 [0.022]  [0.024]  [0.035]  [0.030] 
        
Original  Sin  0.061*** 0.078*** 0.053** 0.052** 
(Hard Currency Debt to 
Total Debt) 
[0.020] [0.022]  [0.021]  [0.021] 
        
Hard Currency Debt to 
GDP 
0.023 ---  --- --- 
 [0.025]       
        
Total debt to GDP  ---  0.017  ---  --- 
   [0.019]     
        
Real GDP per capita 
(logs) 
-0.008 -0.008  ---  --- 
 [0.013]  [0.014]     
        
Growth of money (%)  -0.022  -0.031  ---  --- 
 [0.068]  [0.070]     
        
UK Consol Rate  -0.004  -0.005  -0.022  -0.017 
 [0.031]  [0.030]  [0.020]  [0.020] 
        
Observations 413  414  468  468 
        
Pseudo R-squared  0.125  0.124  0.0493  0.0356 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for sudden stops. 
Average marginal effects on the probability of sudden stops are 
reported. All regressions include the UK Consol Rate to control for 
time-effects and a constant, not shown. 
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects on the Probability of a Sudden Stop 










of one s.d. 
increase 
[dp/dx*sd(x)] 
 Trade Balance to GDP  -0.424 0.047  -0.020 
 Trade Openness  -0.100 0.179  -0.018 
 gold Coverage ratio  -0.060  0.311  -0.019 
 Original Sin   0.061  0.337   0.020 
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Table 4: Determinants of Sudden Stops for various  
SS identification measures 
Dependent Variable : Sudden Stop Indicator 
      
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
      
 SS1  SS2  SS3 
        
Trade Balance to GDP  -0.424**  -0.728**  -0.647*** 
 [0.188]  [0.297]  [0.250] 
      
Trade Openness  -0.100***  0.038  0.049 
 [0.034]  [0.057]  [0.053] 
      
Gold coverage ratio  -0.060***  -0.073**  -0.084** 
 [0.022]  [0.037]  [0.037] 
      
Original Sin  0.061***  0.046*  0.057** 
(Hard Currency Debt to 
Total Debt) 
[0.020] [0.027]  [0.027] 
      
Hard Currency Debt to GDP 0.023  0.112**  0.104** 
 [0.025]  [0.047]  [0.045] 
      
Real GDP per capita 
(logs) 
-0.008 0.016*  0.019** 
 [0.013]  [0.010]  [0.009] 
      
Growth of money (%)  -0.022  -0.001  -0.012 
 [0.068]  [0.114]  [0.123] 
      
UK Consol Rate  -0.004  0.008  0.036 
 [0.031]  [0.045]  [0.052] 
      
Observations 413  413  413 
      
Pseudo R-squared  0.125  0.0804  0.0634 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for sudden 
stops. Average marginal effects on the probability of 
sudden stops are reported. All regressions include the UK 
Consol Rate to control for time-effects and a constant, not 
shown. 
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets. * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: Effects of Sudden Stops and Financial Crises on Growth  
Estimation Using Treatment Effects Model – Maximum Likelihood 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
Growth Equation 
(Dependent Variable is 
growth  of RGDP per 
capita) 
   
      
Initial RGDP per capita  -0.005  -0.005  -0.005 
 [0.034]  [0.032]  [0.031] 
Inflation -0.181***  -0.175***  -0.167*** 
 [0.048]  [0.049]  [0.046] 
Gov. Spending/GDP  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Education  Enrollment    0.190 0.169 0.112 
 [0.242]  [0.247]  [0.267] 
Investment/GDP 0.247**  0.257**  0.247** 
 [0.115]  [0.113]  [0.116] 
Trade Openness (M+X/GDP)  0.090*  0.086*  0.088* 
 [0.047]  [0.048]  [0.053] 
Population Growth  -0.979**  -1.004***  -0.955** 
 [0.398]  [0.375]  [0.393] 
Sudden Stop  -0.041**  -0.043**  -0.042* 
 [0.019]  [0.021]  [0.023] 
Financial Crisis  ---  -0.018  --- 
   [0.012]  
Financial Crisis with SS  
in t-1 to t-3 
--- ---  -0.036** 
     [0.014] 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant -0.001  -0.001  0.009 
 [0.259]  [0.246]  [0.241] 
      
Treatment Probit  
(SS1 is Dep. Var.) 
   
      
TB to GDP  -15.636***  -15.590***  -15.541*** 
 [3.046]  [3.037]  [2.990] 
Trade Openness  -3.679***  -3.662***  -3.673*** 
 [0.838]  [0.818]  [0.810] 
 
Original Sin  











      






      
      
Observations 270  270  270 
      
Notes: Top panel is Growth regression, with real GDP per capita growth 
rate as the dependent variable. Bottom panel is a Treatment regression 
(probit), with sudden stop dummy as the dependent variable. Probit 
coefficients shown).Robust clustered standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Figure 1: Sudden Stops and the average Ratio  
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Sudden Stops (SS1) Banking Crises Currency Crisis Debt Crises
Type of Event
Note:  Probability per year = number of years in crisis divided by total possible years of observation (both numerator 
and denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis
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Type of Event
Note:  Probability per year = number of years in crisis divided by total possible years of observation (both numerator 
and denominator exclude years of ongoing crisis





























































Shaded are years in which a Sudden Stop started for at least one of the countries in the sample























































Shaded are years in which a Sudden Stop started for at least one of the countries in the sample
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Appendix 
 
Our dataset is an unbalanced panel with annual data from 1880 to 1913 for 20 
emerging market countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Denmark, Finland, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 




Bordo et al (2001), Bordo and Meissner (2006), Flandreau and Zúmer (2004), Kostelenos 





Table A1: Sudden Stop Indicator Variables 
Identification Criteria   SS1  SS2  SS3 
There is an annual drop in net capital inflows of at least 2 
standard deviations below the mean of the year-to-year changes 
for the period in that country  
 
and/or it is the first year of a drop in net capital inflows that 
extends over a period shorter than four years and exceeds 3 
percent of that year’s nominal GDP  
●  ●  ● 
and there is a drop in real GDP (any magnitude) during that 
year or the year immediately after.  
●    
and there is a drop in real GDP growth rate during that year or 
the year immediately after. 
   ● 
Number of sudden stops in sample  34 63 63 
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A r g e n t i n a   S S 1              1          1                
  S S 2       1   9    1      1         1   9               1   
  S S 3        1    1      1          1               1   
A u s t r a l i a   S S 1              1   9   9                      
  S S 2              1   9   9        1      1   9           
  S S 3              1   9         1      1   9           
A u s t r i a   S S 1                      1                
  S S 2                     1   9                
  S S 3                     1   9                
B e l g i u m   S S 1                                    
  S S 2   1   9   9   9                          1       
  S S 3     1   9   9                          1       
B r a z i l   S S 1                             1         
 SS2     1 9   1   1 9   1 9         1   1 9 9         1     1         
 SS3     1 9   1   1 9   1 9         1   1 9 9         1     1         
Canada  SS1             1  9  9  9  9  9             1      
  SS2           1  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9            1      1 
  SS3           1  9  9  9   1  9  9  9            1      1 
C h i l e   S S 1        1          1   9            1           
  SS2    1  9   1         1  9     1       1     1     1  9 
  SS3    1  9   1         1  9     1       1     1     1  9 
D e n m a r k   S S 1                                    
  S S 2        1   9                        1       
  S S 3         1                        1       
F i n l a n d   S S 1                        1              
  S S 2                1   9         1              
  S S 3                        1              
G r e e c e   S S 1      1     1        1   9         1        1         
  S S 2      1     1        1   9         1        1         
  S S 3         1        1   9         1        1         
I n d i a   S S 1                         1   9         1   9    
  S S 2                        1   9   9        1   9   9    
  S S 3                         1   9        1   9   9    
I t a l y   S S 1           1                           
  S S 2           1                           
  S S 3           1                           
J a p a n   S S 1              1          1    1         1       
  SS2             1  9        1   1      1  9  9      
  SS3             1  9        1   1      1  9  9      
New 
Zealand 
S S 1      1   9     1   9                           
  SS2     1  9   1  9  9  9  9        1  9  9           1  9    
  SS3     1  9   1  9  9  9  9        1              1    
N o r w a y   S S 1                         1   9            
  S S 2               1   9         1   9   9   9             






































































































































  S S 3                1         1   9   9   9            
P o r t u g a l   S S 1               1                       
  S S 2     1   9          1   9                       
  S S 3     1           1   9                       
Russia  SS1       1  9   1  9  9          1            1    
  SS2       1  9  9  9  9  9         1  9           1  9    
  SS3         1  9  9  9         1  9           1  9    
S p a i n   S S 1                                    
  S S 2          1   9         1   9   9   9                 
  S S 3          1   9         1   9   9   9                 
Sweden  SS1        1                          1  9  
  SS2        1  9    1  9  9  9                   1  9  9 
  S S 3         1      1   9   9   9                    1   9   
United 
States 
S S 1                  1   9                   
  S S 2                  1   9   9               1   9   9   
  S S 3                  1   9   9               1    1   
 




TableA3: Timing of Sudden Stops vs Financial Crises 
(SS1 indicator) 
 
  # of sudden stops coinciding with a 
financial crisis 
% of total 
Same year (t)  6  18% 
From t to t+1  7  21% 
From t to t+2  11  32% 
From t to t+3  14  41% 
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Table A4: Effects of Sudden Stops and Financial Crises on Growth 
Using SS1 as the dependent variable 
 (A)  (B)  (C) 
      
Growth Equation 
(Dependent variable is 
growth  of Real GDP per 
capita) 
   
      
Initial RGDP per capita  -0.003  -0.003  -0.007 
 [0.032]  [0.031]  [0.031] 
Inflation -0.173***  -0.166***  -0.179*** 
 [0.046]  [0.047]  [0.046] 
Gov. Spending/GDP  0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 [0.003]  [0.003]  [0.003] 
Education Enrollment   0.225  0.209  0.208 
 [0.213]  [0.212]  [0.198] 
Investment/GDP 0.236*  0.244**  0.228* 
 [0.121]  [0.119]  [0.126] 
Trade Openness (M+X/GDP)  0.085*  0.080*  0.078 
 [0.045]  [0.046]  [0.050] 
Population Growth  -1.037**  -1.068***  -1.007** 
 [0.422]  [0.397]  [0.436] 
Sudden Stop  -0.030  -0.033  -0.028 
 [0.023]  [0.025]  [0.026] 
Financial Crisis  ---  -0.018  --- 
   [0.012]   
Financial Crisis with SS  
in t-1 to t-3 
--- ---  -0.056*** 
     [0.012] 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant -0.017  -0.019  0.015 
 [0.245]  [0.234]  [0.234] 
Treatment Probit  
(SS1 is Dep. Var.) 
   
      
TB to GDP  -25.709***  -26.449***  -27.483*** 
 [9.369]  [9.449]  [9.830] 
Trade Openness  -7.561**  -7.722**  -8.030** 
 [2.954]  [3.020]  [3.134] 
Original Sin  
(Hard Currency Debt 
/Total Debt) 
1.454*** 1.463*** 1.460*** 
 [0.196]  [0.213]  [0.233] 
gold Coverage Ratio  -2.024**  -2.057**  -2.052** 
 [0.814]  [0.807]  [0.815] 
      
Observations 270  270  270 
      
Notes: Top panel is Growth regression, with real GDP per capita growth 
rate as the dependent variable. Bottom panel is a Treatment regression 
(probit), with sudden stop dummy as the dependent variable. Probit 
coefficients shown for the 5 most important variables.  
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table A5: Determinants of Sudden Stops without lags in independent variables 
(SS1 indicator) 
 
Dependent Variable : Sudden Stop Indicator SS1 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
            
 Trade Balance to GDP  0.030  0.040  0.184  --- 
 [0.109]  [0.109]  [0.223]   
        
 Trade Openness  -0.093***  -0.095***  -0.059  -0.077 
 [0.032]  [0.032]  [0.046]  [0.060] 
        
 Gold coverage ratio  -0.044**  -0.042**  -0.023  -0.026 
 [0.019]  [0.020]  [0.035]  [0.034] 
        
 Original Sin  0.064***  0.079***  0.050**  0.052** 
(Hard Currency Debt to 
Total Debt) 
[0.020] [0.020]  [0.024]  [0.023] 
        
 Hard Currency Debt to 
GDP 
0.020* ---  ---  --- 
 [0.012]       
        
 Total debt to GDP  ---  0.011  ---  --- 
   [0.011]     
        
 Real GDP per capita 
(logs) 
-0.018** -0.020**  ---  --- 
 [0.007]  [0.008]     
        
 Growth of money (%)  0.008  0.002  ---  --- 
 [0.102]  [0.094]     
        
UK Consol Rate  -0.002  -0.005  -0.017  -0.020 
 [0.030]  [0.029]  [0.021]  [0.020] 
        
Observations 423  424  472  472 
        
Pseudo R-squared  0.105  0.103  0.0379  0.0336 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary indicator for sudden stops. 
Average marginal effects on the probability of sudden stops are 
reported. All regressions include the UK Consol Rate to control for 
time-effects and a constant, not shown. 
Robust clustered standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Figure A2: Sudden Stops and Financial Crises by country 
(SS1 indicator) 
 
 
 
 